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Abstract 
Today’s warfighters are bombarded with information and faced with challenging decision spaces 
as technology exponentially expands and threat environments become more complex. Artificial 
intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are advancements that can lessen the burden on the 
warfighter. AI systems offer far-reaching benefits—improving situational awareness and detection 
and understanding of threats and adversary capabilities and intents; identifying and evaluating 
possible tactical courses of action; and offering methods to predict outcomes and effects of 
course of action decisions. AI systems are the key to understanding and addressing highly 
complex tactical situations.  
AI systems offer advantages to the warfighter, but only if these systems are engineered and 
implemented correctly and in a manner that lessens the warfighter’s cognitive load. Implementing 
AI systems for defense applications presents unique challenges. This paper identifies four unique 
challenges and describes how they affect the tactical warfighter, the engineering design 
community, and national defense. This paper offers solution ideas for addressing these unique 
challenges through defense acquisition and systems engineering initiatives. 
Keywords: Artificial intelligence, machine learning, complexity, tactical decision aids, systems 
engineering, trust, human–machine teaming 
Introduction 
AI is a field that includes many different approaches with the objective of creating 
machines with intelligence (Mitchell, 2019). Figure 1 shows a simple Venn diagram with 
machine learning (ML) as a subset of AI, and with AI as a subset of the broader category of 
automation. Automated systems function with minimal human input and often perform repetitive 
tasks based on commands and rules. AI systems perform functions that mimic human 
intelligence. They incorporate learning from past experiences with new information received to 
make decisions and reach conclusions. 
Figure 1. Venn Diagram of Automation, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning 
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There are two primary types of AI systems, as described in Figure 2. The first type, which 
are explicitly programmed, are also known as Handcrafted Knowledge Systems. Allen (2020) 
described Handcrafted Knowledge Systems as “AI that use traditional, rules-based software to 
codify subject matter knowledge of human experts into a long series of programmed ‘if given x 
input, then provide y output’ rules” (p. 3). These systems use traditional, or normal, programming 
languages. The second type are ML systems that are trained from large sets of data. The ML 
systems “learn” from the trained data sets, and the “trained” system is then used operationally to 
produce predicted outcomes given new operational data. 
Figure 2. Two Types of Artificial Intelligence: Explicitly Programmed and Learning Systems 
 
Automation, AI, and ML systems—both handcrafted knowledge systems and learning 
systems—offer great potential for the Department of Defense (DoD) with diverse applications in 
most mission domains. These intelligent systems can extend the DoD’s abilities to make sense 
of complex and uncertain situations, to develop and weigh options, to predict the success of 
actions, and to assess the consequences. They offer the potential to support the DoD in 
strategic, planning, and tactical domains. AI systems can lessen the burden on the warfighter, 
but only if these systems are engineered and implemented correctly and in a manner that 
lessens the warfighter’s cognitive load. Implementing AI systems for defense applications 
presents unique challenges. This paper identifies four unique challenges and describes how 
they affect the tactical warfighter, the engineering design community, and national defense. 
The first unique challenge in implementing AI systems for defense applications is that 
tactical warfare presents highly complex situations. Tactical complexity can involve information 
overload, multiple concurrent missions that need to be addressed, time-critical decisions with 
dire consequences, unknowns/inaccuracies/incompleteness in situational awareness, and 
engineering challenges arising from the interoperability required among a diverse set of 
distributed warfare capabilities. Adding AI systems into this already-complex environment is a 
necessary but highly challenging endeavor.  
The second unique challenge is that AI systems require large amounts of data for the 
systems to be trained. The quality of the resulting AI systems that are developed depends 
largely on the quality and quantity of the training data sets. Data in the military domain can be 
especially hard to come by. Military data may involve classification issues, cyber vulnerabilities, 
data validation challenges, and may simply be very costly and time-consuming to gather based 
on the need for fleet exercises and war games.  
The third unique challenge is that the engineering of AI systems presents a new frontier 
for systems engineering. In traditional systems, behavior is set and is therefore predictable: 
given an input and conditions, the system will produce a predictable output. Some AI solutions 
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may involve systems that are complex in their own right—adapting and learning—and therefore 
producing unforeseen outputs and behaviors. In fact, the intent of some AI systems is to do just 
that—team with a human decision-maker by taking on some of the cognitive load and producing 
intelligent recommendations. Systems engineering methods are needed to engineer intelligent 
systems and ensure that they are explainable, trustable, and safe to human operators.  
The fourth unique challenge is that for defense applications there is always a potential 
adversary that needs to be considered. In terms of AI systems, the acquisition community must 
be mindful that peer competitor nations are making their own strides in AI advancements. U.S. 
defense systems must also advance in this AI race. Cyberattacks are always a possibility in 
defense systems. As defense capabilities increase reliance on automation and AI systems, this 
may be creating more cyber vulnerabilities. Finally, technology is rapidly evolving, and the 
adversarial threat space is changing. The defense acquisition and systems engineering 
communities must ensure that AI systems evolve and adapt to address changes in the threat 
environment and do this in a trustable and safe manner. 
Challenge: Complex Decision Spaces 
The first unique challenge is that many defense domains present a complex decision 
space. Therefore, engineering and implementing appropriate AI systems to address this 
complexity will be highly challenging. Figure 3 highlights some of the many factors that 
contribute to decision complexity in the tactical domain. Naval strike force operations, as an 
example, can quickly change from a peaceful state to one of great peril-- requiring alertness to 
the threat and appropriate response actions—all within a highly compressed decision time line. 
Tactical threats may arise from underwater, on the surface, in the air, from the land, from space, 
or even virtually, resulting in the need to address multiple time-critical missions. With naval and 
defense assets on ships, submarines, aircraft, land, and in space; the tactical decision space 
must address the optimal collaborative use of these dispersed and diverse resources. 
Developing effective tactical courses of action must also occur in highly dynamic operational 
environments with only partial and uncertain situational knowledge. The decision space must 
also consider constraints imposed by command authority, rules of engagement, and tactical 
doctrine. The role of humans as tactical decision-makers adds to the complexity of the decision 
space—with the challenges of information overload, operator error, AI trust, and AI ambiguity 
and explainability issues. Finally, the stakes can be very high for tactical decisions and their 
possible consequences. 
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Figure 3. Factors that Lead to Tactical Decision Space Complexity 
 
Addressing highly complex decision spaces is a challenge for the DoD. AI offers a 
potential solution to addressing this complexity—by handing large amounts of data, dealing with 
uncertainty, making sense of complex situations, developing and evaluating decision 
alternatives, and understanding risk levels and decision consequences. AI solutions can apply 
at the DoD strategic, planning, and tactical levels. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has 
developed an engineering framework and theory for addressing highly complex problem spaces 
that require the use of intelligent and distributed AI systems for gaining situational awareness 
and making collaborative course of action decisions that adapt to a dynamic situation (Johnson, 
2019). A complex tactical scenario was modeled to demonstrate the use of AI to validate the 
approach (Johnson, 2020a). NPS has developed a conceptual design for a predictive analytics 
capability to be implemented as an automated real-time war-gaming system that explores 
different possible tactical courses of action and their predicted effects and red force responses 
(Johnson, 2020b). NPS studies have identified the need to characterize the level of complexity 
during tactical operations and to implement an adaptive human–machine teaming arrangement 
to make tactical decisions where the level of automation adapts according to the level of 
situational complexity. Ongoing NPS research is studying the application of these conceptual 
engineered approaches in a variety of defense use case applications, including air and missile 
defense, over-the-horizon strike, ship self-defense, UAV operations, and laser weapon systems. 
Complex decision spaces create challenging problems for AI systems to try and solve. 
Table 1 compares different AI application domains based on the complexity of their decision 
space. The table contains 10 factors that characterize the complexity of a decision space: 
epistemic uncertainty (the amount of uncertainty in the knowledge of the situation), situational 
dynamics, the decision time line (amount of time to make the decision), the complexity of the 
human interaction in the decision process, the resource complexity (the number, types, distance 
between them, and how dynamic they are), whether there are multiple missions involved, the 
existence of adversaries (competitors, hackers, or outright enemies that intend to destroy or 
overtake), the margin of allowable error (how much decision error is acceptable), and the 
severity of decision consequences.  
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The decision spaces involved in AI applications for advertising (determining which ads to 
stream to specific users based on their buying habits or Internet searches), loan approvals 
(determining loan eligibility based on loan amounts and credit scores), and medical treatments 
(determining diagnoses based on patient symptoms) are relatively straightforward. Large 
amounts of training data exist, calculations and human interaction in the decision process are 
straightforward, and the situations are relatively stable. The consequences of poor advertising 
are minimal. A bad loan approval decision can be audited. Poor medical diagnoses can have 
more serious consequences, but there is often enough time to seek more evaluation and 
opinions before treatment. Determining optimum shipping routes and engineering AI systems for 
self-driving cars are more complicated endeavors. These applications are dynamically changing 
and require shorter amounts of time to make decisions. Shipping routes will have complexity in 
the numbers of possible routes—which can result in many possible options. However, there is 
room for shipping errors, and the consequences are usually not too severe. The margin for 
decision error is very small for self-driving cars. Poor decisions in this application can cause 
serious accidents.  
However, the military tactical domain presents extreme complexity in all areas of the 
decision space: uncertainty and limited knowledge/awareness, highly dynamic situations, very 
limited time lines, complicated human interaction, large numbers and types of resources, 
multiple missions, costly and hard-to-obtain training data sets, extremely small margins of 
allowable errors, and life-or-death consequences of actions (or inaction).  
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Challenge: Data Can Be Hard to Acquire 
The second unique challenge is that AI/ML systems require large amounts of relevant 
and high-quality data for training and development, and these data can be hard to come by in 
the military domain. Handcrafted knowledge systems that are explicitly programmed need data 
during the development process for evaluation and validation. ML systems have an even 
greater dependence on data during development. As shown in Figure 4, ML systems “learn” 
from data sets that represent what the operational conditions and events will be. The process of 
ML system learning is also called being trained, and the data used during the development 
phase are called training data sets. There are several types of ML learning or training—these 
are supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement. All three types of ML learning require training 
data sets. The ML systems continue to need data during the post-deployment or operational 
phase. Figure 4 shows that during operations, the ML system, or “model,” receives operational 
real-time data and determines predictions or decision outcomes by processing the operational 
data with its “trained” algorithms. Thus, throughout the systems engineering and acquisition life 
cycles, the ML system is intimately connected to data. The ML system “emerges” from the 
process of learning from the training data sets. ML systems are a product of the quality, 
sufficiency, and representativeness of the data. They are wholly dependent on their training 
data sets.  
Figure 4. Developing and Implementing Machine Learning Systems 
 
The DoD is beginning to recognize the need for these data sets as more AI developers 
in many domains (warfare, supply chain, security, logistics, etc.) are understanding the potential 
benefit of AI solutions and are embarking on AI system development. In some cases, the data 
exists and is ready to support AI system development. In other cases, the data exists but is not 
saved and stored. Finally, in other cases, the data does not exist and either needs to be 
simulated or gathered in fleet exercises or war games. Figure 5 illustrates a process of 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 327 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
considerations that need to be made to gather, obtain, and in some cases develop data for use 
in developing and training AI and ML systems.  
 
Figure 5. Development of Data Sets for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning System Training 
 
The military domain presents some unique challenges for developing training data 
sets—the data may be classified, the data may present a cyber vulnerability (it could be hacked 
and purposely corrupted by an adversary), and if the data doesn’t exist, it may need to be 
obtained from military/fleet exercises or war games. Data validation is a challenging endeavor 
as well. 
NPS is performing a needs analysis and conceptual design for a data management 
system for the Navy that will collect and provide data to many disparate organizations within the 
Navy that are developing AI/ML systems (French et al., 2021). Figure 6 is a context diagram of 
the Navy Central Artificial Intelligence Library (CAIL) that is envisioned as a data management 
system and process for identifying data sets and providing indexing, validation, auditing, and 
secure access to data that can be used by AI/ML developers working on naval applications. The 
CAIL would not be a data repository or database, but instead, a central organization that 
enables AI/ML developers to access validated and secure naval data—to help identify the 
existence of data sets, enable the authorized access, and help support developers when data 
that is needed does not yet exist and needs to be obtained—possibly through fleet exercises or 
war games. 
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Figure 6. The Conceptual Central Artificial Intelligence Library (CAIL; French et al., 2021) 
 
Challenge: AI Presents a New Frontier for Systems Engineering 
The third unique challenge is that developing AI systems is presenting a new frontier for 
systems engineering. Systems engineering methods have been developed for engineering 
traditional systems that can be highly complicated but also deterministic (Calvano & John, 
2004). Traditional systems have predictable behavior: for a given input and conditions they will 
produce a predictable output. Figure 7 illustrates the need for changes to traditional SE 
methods, like the SE Vee process, in order to engineer AI systems that are complex and 
nondeterministic. In particular, new methods will be needed to define requirements for a 
learning system that adapts over time, and the process of system validation may need to evolve 
and continue during operations to ensure safe and desired behavior. For military systems with 
high stakes consequences, there is very little room for error, so implementing a systems 
engineering process that can ensure safe and desired operations for AI systems is a 
requirement. 
 
Figure 7. Artificial Intelligence: A New Frontier for Systems Engineering 
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A recent initiative by the International Council of Systems Engineers (INCOSE) has 
begun to explore what changes need to be made to systems engineering methods to effectively 
develop AI systems. Figure 8 was created as part of this initiative to highlight five aspects of AI 
systems that need to be considered during the SE process. In addition to nondeterministic and 
evolving behavior, AI systems may present new types of failure modes that are unanticipated, 
may occur suddenly, and whose root causes may be difficult to discern. Robust design—or 
ensuring that AI systems can handle and adapt to future scenarios—is another systems 
engineering design consideration. Finally, for AI systems with more involved human–machine 
interactions, careful attention must be paid to designing systems so they are trustworthy, 
explainable, and ultimately useful to the human decision-makers. 
 
 
Figure 8. Challenges in the Engineering of Artificial Intelligence Systems (Robinson, 2021) 
 
NPS is studying systems engineering methods that can support the design and 
development of complex, adaptive, and intelligent AI systems. A systems engineering 
framework and methodology has been developed to engineer complex adaptive systems of 
systems solutions (Johnson, 2019). The methodology supports the development of systems of 
systems that, through the use of AI, can collaborate to produce desired emergent behavior. A 
current research project is studying safety measures that can be engineered into AI systems 
during the design process to ensure safety during operations (Cruz et al., 2021). NPS is 
studying a design solution called metacognition as an approach for an AI system to identify 
internal errors (Johnson, 2021). Another current NPS thesis project is studying how to engineer 
“trust” into AI systems to ensure effective human–machine teaming arrangements (Hui, 2021). 
Several NPS research projects have studied the use of an SE design approach called coactive 
design to determine interdependences between human operators and AI systems (Blickley et 
al., 2021; Sanchez, 2021). 
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Challenge: Adversaries 
The fourth unique challenge is the presence and role of the adversary in defense 
applications. The DoD must keep up in the race with adversaries to advance AI capabilities, AI 
systems must be protected from cyberattacks, and AI systems must adapt to the ever-changing 
evolution of the threat environment. Figure 9 highlights this unique set of challenges that the 
existence of adversaries presents for AI systems being developed for the DoD. 
Figure 9. Adversarial Challenges 
 
The race among peer competitor nations to develop AI capabilities is ultimately about 
getting inside the adversary’s decision cycle to decide and act faster than the adversary can 
(Rosenberg, 2010). AI systems offer the potential to improve the quality and speed of decisions 
and are therefore critical to gaining decision superiority. As the DoD explores AI solutions, peer 
competitor nations are doing the same. Ultimately, realizing the goal of using AI for the DoD 
depends on more than AI research. It requires proper data gathering and management, 
effective systems engineering and acquisition methods, and careful consideration of the human 
interaction with AI systems. The DoD must ensure that it meets all the challenges involved with 
implementing AI systems in order to win the race. An NPS research initiative is studying how to 
apply AI and game theory to get inside an adversary’s tactical decision cycle (Johnson, 2020b). 
This project is developing a concept for creating models of the tactical situation, the adversaries’ 
location and capabilities, and a prediction of what the adversaries know about the situation. The 
conceptual system would then play a real-time “war game” to analyze tactical decision options 
based on predicted adversarial responses and second- and third-order effects. This is an 
example of studying what future tactical warfare might be like with enhanced knowledge and 
decision aids for both blue and red forces. Other NPS initiatives to prepare the DoD for the AI 
race include studying new SE methods and acquisition practices for developing AI capabilities, 
studying the data management needs of the Navy and the DoD (French et al., 2021), and 
studying AI system safety risks to develop engineering practices that ensure safe AI capabilities 
(Cruz et al., 2021; Johnson, 2021). 
Cyber warfare is another race that the DoD must successfully compete in to stay ahead 
of the constant onslaught of hacking attempts. As the DoD implements more automation, it 
naturally results in more cyber vulnerabilities. The use of AI systems that are intrinsically 
dependent on both trained and operational data, opens up opportunities for hackers to poison 
the systems with corrupt data during the development phase and also during the operational 
phase. If an adversary gains control of an operational AI system, the possible harm they can 
inflict will depend on the application domain. For automation that supports weapon control 
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decisions, the consequences can be deadly. In a recent study on automotive cybersecurity, a 
car company posted a fake vehicle electronic control unit online, and in under 3 days, 25,000 
breach attempts were made (Taub, 2021). The DoD must be mindful of the particular cyber 
vulnerabilities presented as AI systems are developed. Careful cyber risk analysis and cyber 
defense strategies must be implemented for each new AI system. NPS is studying data security 
requirements for ensuring that ML training data sets are safe from hacking and will require 
secure authorization to access (French et al., 2021). NPS is studying the use of metacognition 
as a method for AI systems to perform self-evaluation as a means to identify cyber intrusions, 
tampering, or any unusual behavior (Johnson, 2020b). NPS is also studying the use of ML to 
identify malicious spoofing and tampering with the Global Positioning System (GPS; Kennedy, 
2020). 
The evolution of the threat environment is the third adversarial race for the DoD as it 
develops AI systems. As the adversarial threat space is constantly changing over time with 
faster and more lethal weapons, more autonomy, greater surveillance assets, more advanced 
countermeasures, and more stealth, this poses a challenge for the DoD to be able to anticipate 
and identify new threats and cope with unknowns in the battlespace. NPS research is focused 
on engineering systems that continue to adapt and learn during operations to detect and identify 
unknown unknowns in the battlespace and quickly respond to new threats through innovative 
courses of action (Grooms, 2019; Jones et al., 2020; Wood, 2019). NPS is studying ML 
methods for identifying anomalies in patterns of life by studying data over time for a given region 
to identify unusual changes (Zhao et al., 2016). An example is the study of commercial aircraft 
flight patterns and identifying suspicious aircraft based on unusual flight patterns. Ground-based 
operations can be surveilled over time to identify new and unusual construction projects that 
could signify military operations. 
Conclusions 
AI systems offer the DoD significant advances in achieving and maintaining knowledge 
and decision superiority. However, implementing AI systems for defense applications presents 
unique challenges. The military tactical domain presents extreme complexity in all areas of the 
decision space: uncertainty and limited knowledge, highly dynamic situations, very limited time 
lines, complicated human interaction, large numbers and types of resources, multiple missions, 
costly and hard-to-obtain training data sets, extremely small margins of allowable errors, and 
life-or-death consequences of actions (or inaction). AI systems, and ML systems in particular, 
require representative, sufficient, secure, and validated data sets for their development. 
Gathering suitable data for defense application has the additional challenges of handling 
classified data sets and ensuring that data is secure and protected from cyberattacks; it will also 
be a major endeavor to gather real-world data that represents tactical operations. New systems 
engineering methods will be required to effectively specify, design, and evaluate AI systems that 
present new levels of complexity through their non-determinism, new types of human–machine 
teaming challenges, and new safety failure modes that are hard to anticipate and prevent. 
Finally, the existence of adversaries in the military domain presents an AI race in three forms: a 
race to develop AI systems as quickly as adversaries, a race to stay ahead of possible 
cyberattacks, and a race to train AI/ML systems that can cope with the ever-advancing 
adversarial threat space. 
NPS is addressing the four unique challenge areas through a series of ongoing research 
initiatives. NPS researchers are studying the implementation of AI systems in the naval tactical 
warfighting domain, conducting needs analysis and requirements development for military data 
sets, studying systems engineering methods for developing complex AI systems, and 
developing methods to engineer AI systems that are safe, trustable, and mindful of the role of 
potential adversaries. NPS is providing AI research and educational opportunities for military 
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officers and civilian students. NPS welcomes collaboration with the DoD and naval 
organizations to continue studying AI systems for defense applications and to continue 
exploring solution strategies and methods for overcoming the challenges of developing and 
implementing AI capabilities. 
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